

# COVID-19 & Healthcare Workers

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**Hat yai, Songkla, Thailand**

# Scope of presentations

**Part 1: Probability of getting infected, hospitalized or dying from COVID 19 infection among healthcare workers.**

**Probability of spreading the disease to their families and the outcomes.**

**Part 2: Infection control to prevent COVID-19 infection .**

# Part 1:



ORIGINAL ARTICLE

# Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia

Qun Li, M.Med., Xuhua Guan, Ph.D., Peng Wu, Ph.D., Xiaoye Wang, M.P.H., Lei Zhou, M.Med., Yeqing Tong, Ph.D., Ruiqi Ren, M.Med., Kathy S.M. Leung, Ph.D., Eric H.Y. Lau, Ph.D., Jessica Y. Wong, Ph.D., Xuesen Xing, Ph.D., Nijuan Xiang, M.Med., Yang Wu, M.Sc., Chao Li, M.P.H., Qi Chen, M.Sc., Dan Li, M.P.H., Tian Liu, B.Med., Jing Zhao, M.Sc., Man Liu, M.Sc., Wenxiao Tu, M.Med., Chuding Chen, M.Sc., Lianmei Jin, M.Med., Rui Yang, M.Med., Qi Wang, M.P.H., Suhua Zhou, M.Med., Rui Wang, M.D., Hui Liu, M.Med., Yingbo Luo, M.Sc., Yuan Liu, M.Med., Ge Shao, B.Med., Huan Li, M.P.H., Zhongfa Tao, M.P.H., Yang Yang, M.Med., Zhiqiang Deng, M.Med., Boxi Liu, M.P.H., Zhitao Ma, M.Med., Yanping Zhang, M.Med., Guoqing Shi, M.P.H., Tommy T.Y. Lam, Ph.D., Joseph T. Wu, Ph.D., George F. Gao, D.Phil., Benjamin J. Cowling, Ph.D., Bo Yang, M.Sc., Gabriel M. Leung, M.D., and Zijian Feng, M.Med.et al.

January 29, 2020

DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa2001316

**425 cases**

**Table 1.** Characteristics of Patients with Novel Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia in Wuhan as of January 22, 2020.\*

Characteristic	Before January 1 (N=47)	January 1 –January 11 (N=248)	January 12 –January 22 (N=130)
Median age (range) — yr	56 (26–82)	60 (21–89)	61 (15–89)
Health care worker — no./total no. (%)	0/47	7/248 (3)	8/122 (7)

# Take home message:

The chance of getting COVID 19 in worst case scenario among Chinese healthcare workers (HCWs) was about 5%.

CORRESPONDENCE

## Death from Covid-19 of 23 Health Care Workers in China

**TO THE EDITOR:** The National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China has reported that as of February 24, 2020, a total of 3387 of 77,262 patients with Covid-19 (4.4%) in China were health care workers or others who worked in medical facilities.<sup>1,2</sup> According to the Chinese Red Cross their condition then deteriorated quickly; all but 3 of these persons were 50 years of age or older. After their condition deteriorated, 12 of the 23 health care workers were transferred from the hospitals where they were first admitted to specialized intensive care units in other hospitals or

**“ As of March 31, none of the 42,600 health care workers who went to Hubei Province to care for patients with Covid-19 were known to have been infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).”**

## **Take home message:**

**The chance of getting COVID 19 in worst case scenario among Chinese HCWs was about 5%.**

**This risk probably was diminished following better infection control practices among 42600 Chinese HCWs mobilized to rescue Wuhan.**

**How severe is COVID-19  
infection in HCWs???**

JAMA | Original Investigation | CARING FOR THE CRITICALLY ILL PATIENT

# Clinical Characteristics of 138 Hospitalized Patients With 2019 Novel Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia in Wuhan, China

Dawei Wang, MD; Bo Hu, MD; Chang Hu, MD; Fangfang Zhu, MD; Xing Liu, MD; Jing Zhang, MD; Binbin Wang, MD; Hui Xiang, MD; Zhenshun Cheng, MD; Yong Xiong, MD; Yan Zhao, MD; Yirong Li, MD; Xinghuan Wang, MD; Zhiyong Peng, MD

**Wuhan University Hospital**  
**138 nCoV- pneumonia cases**  
**57 (41%) = hospital-acquired**  
**17 (12.3%) = nosocomial in-patients**  
**40 (29%) = healthcare workers**

	No. (%)	
	Total (N = 138)	ICU (n = 36)
Infected		
Hospitalized patients	17 (12.3)	9 (25.0)

# Take home message:

If HCWs develop nCoV 2019 pneumonia, the chance of being severe (needs ICU care) is 1 in 40.

Thus, the probability of a young doctor getting COVID 19 and has to be admitted into ICU was only  $1/20 \times 1/40 = 1$  in 800.

**How about the mortality ???**

# Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

16-24 February 2020

**NHCPRC reported that ,up until February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2055 Chinese healthcare workers had been confirmed infected with COVID-19, with 22 (1.1%) deaths.**

CORRESPONDENCE

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**As of April 3, a total of 23 of the health care professionals among these 3387 persons had died from Covid-19. CFR= 0.7%**

# Take home message:


**Eventhough many of the Chinese healthcare workers were infected with COVID 19, the case fatality rate was low.**

**How about Thailand ???**

ในประเทศ

## "โควิด -19" ติดเชือบุคคลากรการแพทย์ ในไทย คนแรก

วันที่ 15 กุมภาพันธ์ 2563 - 13:01 น.



# บุคลากรทางการแพทย์ ติดเชื้อโควิด-19 เพิ่มรายวัน!!

สถานการณ์

ข้อมูล ณ วันที่ 13 เม.ย. 63

จำนวนบุคลากรทางการแพทย์  
ติดเชื้อโควิด-19

**102** ราย

%ของการติดเชื้อ  
ทั้งหมด

**4%**

ติดเชื้อจากการ  
ปฏิบัติหน้าที่

**65%**



ติดเชื้อจาก  
ในชุมชน

**20%**



ไม่สามารถ  
ระบุได้

**15%**



พยาบาล

**40%**



แพทย์

**10%**



ผู้ช่วยแพทย์  
และพยาบาล

**10%**

**None of the 102 infected Thai healthcare workers had died of COVID 19 infection.**

# Take home message:

**The situation of COVID infections in Thai healthcare workers is pretty much the same as in China in that the case fatality rate is likely to be very low.**

**We agree that the case fatality rates in HCWs with COVID 19 were low. But what did they die from ???**

CORRESPONDENCE

## Death from Covid-19 of 23 Health Care Workers in China

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**As of April 3, a total of 23 of the health care professionals among these 3387 persons had died from Covid-19. CFR= 0.7%**

**All but three were  $\geq$  50 year old**

**11/23 persons had been rehired after retirement,**

**5 Had known underlying chronic conditions.**

**13 were physicians.**

# Take home message:

**Most of HCWs who died from COVID 19 disease were either old or had underlying diseases.**

## Journal Pre-proof

Characteristics of health worker fatality in China during the outbreak of COVID-19 infection

Wei Li , Jie Zhang , Shifu Xiao , Lin Sun

PII: S0163-4453(20)30158-4  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinf.2020.03.030>  
Reference: YJINF 4504

To appear in: *Journal of Infection*

Accepted date: 18 March 2020




Table 1. Demographics of deceased medical workers in China by Mar 16, 2020.

Characteristic	Total (n=24)	COVID-19 infection (n=13, 54.2%)	Sudden death (n=8, 33.3%)	Traffic accident (n=3, 12.5%)
Age, Median (IQR) -yrs	50.5(36.25-56.5)	51(38.0-58.0)	50(36.25-56.5)	/
Male, No. (%)	20(83.3)	11(84.6)	7(87.5)	2(66.7)

A





## **Take home message:**

**Only half of the fatalities in Chinese healthcare workers infected with coronavirus were caused directly by the infections. Some died from traffic accidents and ? underlying heart diseases precipitated by ? work exhaustion.**





**From whom did HCWs get COVID-19 ???**

**? Their families ?**

**?Their co-workers ?**

**?Their patients?**

# Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

16-24 February 2020

**“Investigations among HCWs suggest that many may have been infected within the household rather than in a health care setting.”**

# Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Emerging and Future Challenges for Dental and Oral Medicine

Journal of Dental Research  
1–7  
© International & American Associations  
for Dental Research 2020  
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[sagepub.com/journals-permissions](http://sagepub.com/journals-permissions)  
DOI: 10.1177/0022034520914246  
[journals.sagepub.com/home/jdr](http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jdr)

L. Meng<sup>1</sup>, F. Hua<sup>2</sup>, and Z. Bian<sup>1</sup>

**This paper mentions about COVID  
19 in Chinese dental healthcare  
personnels.**

Patient No.<sup>a</sup>

Occupation

Are There Any Close  
Contacts Infected?

1	Doctor
2	Nurse
3	Nurse
4	Administrator
5	Nurse
6	Administrator
7	MD student
8	Doctor
9	Doctor

No

No

Family members<sup>d</sup>

1 family member

Family members

Family members<sup>b</sup>

1 family member

1 family member

1 family member

**Only 2 of 9 dental healthcare workers had COVID 19 from unknown origin. The rest contracted the disease from their families.**

# Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

16-24 February 2020

**In China, human-to-human transmission of the COVID-19 virus is largely occurring in families. Among 344 clusters involving 1308 cases in Guangdong and Sichuan Provinces, 78%-85% have occurred in families.**

**Take home message:**

**You may get COVID 19 from your family members rather than from your patients.**

**Beware of your wife !**

**From whom did HCWs get COVID-19 ???**

**? Their families ?**

**If I contract COVID 19, what is the probability that I may pass the infection to my family ???**

**The secondary attack rates in households ranged from 3-10% in Guangdong.**

*Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 16-24 February 2020, page 8.*

• New coronavirus pneumonia prevention and control •

Expressway

## Analysis on epidemiological characteristics of new-type coronavirus pneumonia family aggregation epidemic in Zhejiang Province

Sun Wanwan Ling Feng Pan Jinren Cai Jian Miao Ziping Liu Shelan Cheng Wei Chen Enfu

Chinese Journal of Preventive Medicine, 2020,54: Online pre-publishing . DOI: 10.3760 / cma.j.cn112150-20200227-00199

**Family secondary attack rate for subsequent cases = 31.6%**

## Take home message:

**The probability that you might further propagate the disease to your family was 3-32%.**

**148 index cases with family clustering**



**Mean serial interval of 3 days**



**189 subsequent cases and 54 asymptomatic infected cases.**

**Who, in your family, will get COVID virus from you?**

relationship

**No. Symptomatic**

**Total no. Attack rate(%)**

**Are they going to die ???**

**Vital Surveillances**

# **The Epidemiological Characteristics of an Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Diseases (COVID-19) — China, 2020**

The Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Emergency Response Epidemiology Team

***Zhonghua Liu Xing Bing Xue Za Zhi. 2020;41(2):145–151.  
DOI:10.3760/cma.j.issn.0254-6450.2020.02.003.***

Baseline Characteristics	Confirmed Cases, N (%)	Deaths, N (%)	Case Fatality Rate, %
Age, years			
0–9	416 (0.9)	–	–
10–19	549 (1.2)	1 (0.1)	1 (0.1)
20–29	3,619 (8.1)	7 (0.7)	7 (0.7)
30–39	7,600 (17.0)	18 (1.8)	18 (1.8)
40–49	8,571 (19.2)	38 (3.7)	38 (3.7)

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# Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of 99 cases of 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia in Wuhan, China: a descriptive study

*Nanshan Chen\*, Min Zhou\*, Xuan Dong\*, Jieming Qu\*, Fengyun Gong, Yang Han, Yang Qiu, Jingli Wang, Ying Liu, Yuan Wei, Jia'an Xia, Ting Yu, Xinxin Zhang, Li Zhang*

**Jinyintan Hospital**  
**99 Pneumonia cases**

Patients (n=99)

Age, years

Mean (SD)

55.5 (13.1)

≤39

10 (10%)

40-49

22 (22%)

50-59

30 (30%)

60-69

22 (22%)

≥70

15 (15%)

Chronic medical illness

50 (51%)

Cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases

40 (40%)

Digestive system disease

11 (11%)

Endocrine system disease†

13 (13%)

# Take home message:

**No COVID pneumonia case in this series was younger than 20 year old..**

# Take home message:

**The chance of death from COVID 19 among children is almost nil. If you get COVID -19 and pass the virus to your child, he (or she) is unlikely to get sick or die from this disease.**


**From whom did HCWs get COVID-19 ???**

**? Their families ?**

**? Their co-workers ?**

# One nosocomial cluster following with a familial cluster of COVID-19 cases: the potential transmission risk in patients with negative swab tests

**CURRENT STATUS:** POSTED



**All these HCWs had to be excluded from duty and received either self-quarantined at home or were admitted to hospital for isolation and treatment.**

**An occurrence of COVID 19 among hospital staffs might lead to considerable loss of manpower because many exposed HCWs needed to be excluded from duty for at least 2 weeks.**

What should you do to mitigate this potential mishap ??

**Masks, ?Fixed team assignment**

**From whom did HCWs get COVID-19 ???**

**? Their families ?**

**? Their co-workers ?**

**? Their patients?**

**How HCWs got COVID-19 from the patients ???**

## Journal Pre-proof

Reply to “Coronavirus 2019-nCoV: A brief perspective from the front line”: Nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 infection among nurses in Wuhan from a single center

Huimin Sun , Mengxin Lu , Song Chen , Zhenshun Cheng ,  
Yong Xiong , Xinghuan Wang

PII: S0163-4453(20)30163-8  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinf.2020.03.036>  
Reference: YJINF 4510

To appear in: *Journal of Infection*

Accepted date: 22 March 2020



# **A review of 32 nurses infected by SARS-CoV-2 at Wuhan University Hospital.**

**65.6% (21/32) was from nosocomial infection,  
18 Without isolation measures.**

**3 With isolation measures**

**15.6% (5/32) was community acquired.**

**18.8% (6/32) from unknown sources.**

# บุคลากรทางการแพทย์ ติดเชื้อโควิด-19 เพิ่มรายวัน!!

สถานการณ์

ข้อมูล ณ วันที่ 13 เม.ย. 63

จำนวนบุคลากรทางการแพทย์  
ติดเชื้อโควิด-19

**102** ราย

%ของการติดเชื้อ  
ทั้งหมด

**4%**

ติดเชื้อจากการ  
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พยาบาล

**40%**



แพทย์

**10%**



ผู้ช่วยแพทย์  
และพยาบาล

**10%**

## สาเหตุการติดเชื้อ

50%

ผู้ป่วยปกปิดประวัติ  
เสี่ยงต่อการสัมผัส  
เชื้อโควิด-19

# Take home message:

**Half of the nosocomial COVID 19 infection acquired by HCWs occurred in the settings of unrecognized or delayed diagnosis of the disease together with unprepared infection control practices.**

# Delayed or misdiagnosis of COVID-19



Fresh voices from today's China

Rising Tones

# Coronavirus' Assault on Wuhan Mental Hospital Alarms Experts

Despite the compounded challenge of having to treat patients for COVID-19 as well as mental illness, Wuhan's psychiatric facilities have largely been left to fend for themselves.



การติดเชื้อในโรงพยาบาลในศูนย์สุขภาพจิตหวู่ฮั่นผู้ป่วยประมาณ 80 รายได้รับการวินิจฉัยว่าเป็นโรคปอดบวมใหม่

ต้นฉบับ ลือยาก Minamata จีนข่าวรายสัปดาห์ 8 กุมภาพันธ์

## 周刊君说★

ผู้ป่วยประมาณ 50 คนและเจ้าหน้าที่ทางการแพทย์ 30 คน  
วินิจฉัยด้วยโรคปอดบวมแบบใหม่

เมื่อวันที่ 8 กุมภาพันธ์ "China News Weekly" ได้เรียนรู้โดยเฉพาะว่ามีการติดเชื้อในโรงพยาบาลในศูนย์สุขภาพจิตหวู่ฮั่น แหล่งอ้างอิงภายในโรงพยาบาลมีผู้ป่วยอย่างน้อยประมาณ 50 คนและเจ้าหน้าที่ทางการแพทย์ 30 คนได้รับการวินิจฉัยว่าเป็นโรคปอดบวมแบบใหม่

**An outbreak of COVID -19 diseases involving 50 patients and 30 HCWs occurred in a Wuhan mental hospital.**

# Take home message:

**Not just the OPDs, unsuspected exposure to COVID-19 might also occur in any IPDs.**

**Every patient must be screened for COVID-19.**

**How to prevent COVID-19  
infection from a delayed or  
unrecognized cases?**

# Example 1

## Journal Pre-proof

Risk of nosocomial transmission of coronavirus disease 2019: an experience in a general ward setting in Hong Kong

S.C.-Y. Wong, R.T.-S. Kwong, T.C. Wu, J.W.M. Chan, M.Y. Chu, S.Y. Lee, H.Y. Wong, D.C. Lung



PII: S0195-6701(20)30174-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2020.03.036>

**An 64 yo.unrecognized COVID-19 patient had stayed in an open cubicle (bed 2) ward A with 10 other patients for 35 hours before being transferred to airborne infection isolation room.AIR for intubation.**





**Ward A is a 53-bedded female medical ward for renal patients. (6 ACH, normal pressure setting)**



**A total of 71 staff and 49 patients were identified as contacts.**

# Close Contacts

**7 staffs = had contact within two metres of the index case for >15 minutes.**

**were subjected to a 14-day work exclusion and quarantine.**

**10 patients = shared the same cubicle with the index case.**

**were quarantined into an AIIR (or quarantine camp if patient was deemed clinically stable) for 14 days**

**Other staff and patient contacts ('casual contacts') were subjected to medical surveillance for 28 days with no restriction to work or discharge from hospital.**

# Results:

Thirty staff and 22 patients developed fever and/or reported respiratory symptoms during the surveillance period.

All specimens from the 52 contacts were negative for SARS-CoV-2, including all patient close contacts and six of the seven staff close contacts.

**Why not infected ?????**

**All seven close contact staffs reported wearing a mask ( Five, N95s and two, surgical masks, respectively ) during patient contacts.**

**Six close contact patients who were in the same cubicle as the index case also wore surgical masks (although not consistently in some.). Four did not wear a mask at all.**

(b)



**Simple facemask  
(Hudson mask)  
used for high-flow  
oxygen therapy on  
the index patient  
during her stay in  
ward A.**

## **Take home message:**

**All the 10 patients in the same cubicle as the index case did not get COVID 19.**

**In this scenario, COVID -19 probably is not air-borne.**

## Take home message:

**Contrary to the belief that high flow oxygen mask might aerosolize the infection, this oxygen mask did not spread the disease in this incidence.**

**However, we still don't know whether it prevented the infection or not.**

# Example 2

# Annals of Internal Medicine

## OBSERVATION: BRIEF RESEARCH REPORT

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### COVID-19 and the Risk to Health Care Workers: A Case Report

***Ng K, et al. Ann Intern Med. 2020 Mar 16:L20-0175. doi:  
10.7326/L20-0175.***

**February 2020**



**A middle-aged man with DM**



**Hospitalized for community-acquired pneumonia.**



**The following day.....**



**Endotracheal intubation in ICU**



**Difficult intubation**



**Video laryngoscope with airway bougie<sup>88</sup>**

**Mechanical ventilation**



**Three days later**



**Extubated**



**Nasopharyngeal swab**



**Swab positive for COVID- PCR**



**41 HCWS quarantined**



<b>Procedures</b>	<b>No. of HCWs</b>	<b>PPE</b>	
		<b>Surgical mask</b>	<b>N95</b>
<b>Endotracheal Intubation</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Extubation</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Oral suction</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Non invasive Ventilation</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>35 (85.4%)</b>	<b>6 (14.6%)</b>

**None of these 41 healthcare workers developed fever or cough. All had multiple PCR-negative swabs.**

# Take home message:

**Masks ( either surgical or N95) were protective in this close contact with COVID19 patient incidence.**

# Part 2:



**A nurse with a baby with the coronavirus at an isolation ward of Wuhan Children's Hospital on March 16, 2020. *China Daily via Reuters* <sup>94</sup>**

# COVID 2019 & IC



# Personnel Preparedness: Keywords

**Education & Training**

**Maximize Their Safety**

# **SARS Transmission among Hospital Workers in Hong Kong**

Joseph T.F. Lau,\* Kitty S. Fung,\* Tze Wai Wong,\* Jean H. Kim,\* Eric Wong,\* Sydney Chung,\*  
Deborah Ho,\* Louis Y. Chan,\* S.F. Lui,† and Augustine Cheng\*

*EID 2004;10:280-6*

**Infection control training <2 hours was a significant independent risk factors for SARS infection.**

**How to prevent getting 2019 nCoV ???**

# Screening:



**เมื่อผู้ป่วยมาถึง  
ให้พบกับพยาบาลตรวจคัดกรองก่อน  
เพื่อซักประวัติการไอ และความเกี่ยวข้องกับ  
ประเทศที่มีการแพร่เชื้อโรค SARS**

**Finding a suspected case of nCoV  
infection: What to do next ???**

# **Respiratory Viruses Transmission: How?**

## **Possible Modes of Spread**

# 3 possible mechanisms

## 1. Contacts (Direct or Indirect (Fomites))

- self-inoculation after touching contaminated surfaces

## 2. Droplets or large particles

- >5 microns particles
- close person-to-person contact
- at a distance of  $\leq 0.9$  m (3 feet)

# 3 Possible Modes of Spread

## 3. small-particle aerosols (airborne)

- **< 3-5 microns**
- **generated by coughing or sneezing**
- **traverse distances > 1.8 m**
- **such as occur with measles, varicella, and sometimes influenza**

# *Modes of transmission of respiratory syncytial virus*

Caroline Breese Hall, M.D.,\* and R. Gordon Douglas, Jr., M.D., Rochester, N.Y.

***J Pediatr. 1981 Jul;99(1):100-3.***

**Three groups of volunteers were exposed to infants with RSV.**

**Gr 1 (*Cuddlers*): Wore gowns, but no masks or gloves. Caring for the infants for 2-3 hrs. (feeding, changing the diaper, and playing with the infant).**

**Gr.2 (Touchers):** Touched surfaces (eg. countertops, cribs, pacifiers, toys, oxygen tent.) with ungloved hand when the infant was out of the room. They then gently rubbed the mucous membranes of their nose or eye.

**Gr 3 (*Sitters*):** Sit at a distance of  $> 6$  ft. from the bed, wore gowns and gloves, but not masks.

---

*Volunteers*

---

No exposed

No infected

Afebrile URI§

Febrile URI

Asymptomatic

Incubation

---

# Take home message:

**You can easily get RSV while taking care of RSV baby (5 out of 7) or touching the contaminated surfaces (4 of 10)**

**Now let us examine the COVID -19 room:**



# EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES®

ISSN: 1080-6059

[EID Journal](#) > [Volume 26](#) > [Early Release](#) > [Main Article](#)



*Disclaimer: Early release articles are not considered as final versions. Any changes will be reflected in the online version in the month the article is officially released.*

Volume 26, Number 7—July 2020

*Dispatch*


## Aerosol and Surface Distribution of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Hospital Wards, Wuhan, China, 2020

Zhen-Dong Guo<sup>1</sup>, Zhong-Yi Wang<sup>1</sup>, Shou-Feng Zhang<sup>1</sup>, Xiao Li, Lin Li, Chao Li, Yan Cui, Rui-Bin Fu, Yun-Zhu Dong, Xiang-Yang Chi, Meng-Yao Zhang, Kun Liu, Cheng Cao, Bin Liu, Ke Zhang, Yu-Wei Gao✉, Bing Lu✉, and Wei Chen✉

### On This Page


[The Study](#)

# A




**Patient  
Room**

# A




**B**



**Figure B: General ward housing 24 COVID patients with milder diseases.**

**Patient room**

# C



Site 2

Site 1

2.5 m

1 m

0 m

-0.5 m

Area, sample	Intense positive/weak positive/negative†	Rate of positivity, %
<b>PPE in ICU with severe COVID patients</b>		
Sleeve cuff of medical staff	0/1/5	16.7
Glove of medical staff	0/1/3	25

# USE HAND SANITIZER

Use sanitizers to keep your hands and personal accessories clean.

The Creation of Adam / by Michelangelo




Ministry of Culture and  
Information Policy of Ukraine

#ArtOfQuarantine  
#FlattenTheCurve

# WASH YOUR *HANDS*

Frequently wash your hands with soap to kill the viruses, that may be on them.



Portrait of a Young Man in Red / by Raphael



Ministry of Culture and  
Information Policy of Ukraine

*#ArtOfQuarantine*  
*#FlattenTheCurve*



# hand hygiene saves lives

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLE™

# USE GLOVES

Wear disposable gloves to avoid contact with potentially infected surfaces.



Praying Madonna / by Giovanni Battista Salvi



Ministry of Culture and  
Information Policy of Ukraine

#ArtOfQuarantine  
#FlattenTheCurve

**Yes, you can prevent  
the H1N1 Flu!**



**Do NOT touch the  
Tzone!**

mucous membranes  
of your eyes, nose or  
mouth are where germs  
enter your body!

**Visit [www.henrythehand.com](http://www.henrythehand.com)**



**ใคร?**  
ต้องใส่หน้ากากอนามัย (Mask)  
1. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยตลอดเวลา  
2. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมจมูกและปาก  
3. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมตา  
4. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมหู

**ห้องล้างมือ**

กรุณาติดต่อหน้า  
ก่อน  
ด้านหลัง

กรุณาปฏิบัติตาม  
ข้อควรระวังต่อไปนี้.....  
1. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยตลอดเวลา  
2. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมจมูกและปาก  
3. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมตา  
4. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมหู  
5. สวมหน้ากากอนามัยที่คลุมหู

- ไม้
- หน้ากาก
- หน้ากากอนามัย

**ระวังไม่ให้ผู้ป่วยสัมผัสกับแฟ้มประวัติ  
การจัดส่งแฟ้มต้องทำโดยเจ้าหน้าที่ของโรงพยาบาล**

# How far can RSV go?

---

*Volunteers*

---

No. exposed

No infected


Afebrile URI§

Febrile URI

Asymptomatic

Incubation

---



## **Modes of transmission of respiratory syncytial virus. *Hall C:J. Pediatr 1981;99:100-103***

The third group, called "sitters," was exposed to an infected baby by sitting at a distance of >1.8 m from the bed. They wore gowns and gloves, but no masks. Only the cuddlers and touchers became infected, which suggests that routes that require close or direct contact with infectious secretions and self-inoculation were the major or most effective means of transmission.

**Now let us examine how far can coronaviruses go.**

# Cluster of SARS among Medical Students Exposed to Single Patient, Hong Kong

Tze-wai Wong,\* Chin-kei Lee,† Wilson Tam,\* Joseph Tak-fai Lau,\* Tak-sun Yu,\* Siu-fai Lui,‡ Paul K.S. Chan,\* Yuguo Li,§ Joseph S. Bresee,¶ Joseph J.Y. Sung,\* and Umesh D. Parashar,¶  
for the Outbreak Study Group\*<sup>1</sup>

***Emerging Infectious Diseases 2004;10:269-275***

**Feb 24,2003: the index SARS case became ill.**


**Mar 4: Visited ER & was admitted into a general ward**

**Had pneumonia on his rt. Lung.**


**Mar 6-Mar 12: Rx with nebulized bronchodilator**

**Mar 4-10: 66 med. students visited this ward.**


**Mar 6-7: 20 (3<sup>rd</sup> yr). med students were in the ward for a 40 min. bedside clinical assessment session**



**Mar7-23: 16(24%) of med. students and 5 of 11 evaluators became ill.**



**Index Case**



None of the students examined the index patient (Bed 11)

Examined patient in bed no.

Bed 12 (< 1 m. of index case bed)

Bed 14, 15, 9, 16X (> 1m, same cubicle)

Beds outside this cubicle

Attack rate

3/3

4/8

0/8<sup>131</sup>

**Take home message:**

**SARS coronavirus usually did not spread beyond cubicle limit.**



# EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES®

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
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Zhen-Dong Guo<sup>1</sup>, Zhong-Yi Wang<sup>1</sup>, Shou-Feng Zhang<sup>1</sup>, Xiao Li, Lin Li, Chao Li, Yan Cui, Rui-Bin Fu, Yun-Zhu Dong, Xiang-Yang Chi, Meng-Yao Zhang, Kun Liu, Cheng Cao, Bin Liu, Ke Zhang, Yu-Wei Gao✉, Bing Lu✉, and Wei Chen✉


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
[The Study](#)

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


# A



**A**


**All 184 sampling sites were negative except computer mouse (4 of 8) and 3 samples each from floor of Medication Room and PPE Removal Room 4**

**B**

**Figure B: General ward housing 24 COVID patients with milder diseases.**

**Patient room**

# C



Site 2

Site 1


2.5 m

1 m

0 m

-0.5 m

**B**



**Patient  
corridor  
(26samples):  
Floor=0%  
Air =0%**

**All 70 sampling  
specimens from  
dressing/undressing  
rooms (Floor,indoor air,  
door knobs) =negative**

**Take home message:**

**COVID-19 usually also did not spread beyond isolation room or ward.**

**Finding a suspected case of nCoV  
infection: What to do next ???**



**Screening**

**Mask for the patient**

# Influenza Virus Aerosols in Human Exhaled Breath: Particle Size, Culturability, and Effect of Surgical Masks

Donald K. Milton<sup>1,2\*</sup>, M. Patricia Fabian<sup>2,3</sup>, Benjamin J. Cowling<sup>4</sup>, Michael L. Grantham<sup>1</sup>, James J. McDevitt<sup>2</sup>

***Milton D et al., PLoS Pathog 2013; 9(3): e1003205.  
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003205***

**Surgical masks produced a 3.4  
(95% CI 1.8 to 6.3) fold reduction  
in viral copies in exhaled breath.**

A Quantitative Assessment  
of the Efficacy of Surgical and N95  
Masks to Filter Influenza Virus  
in Patients with Acute Influenza  
Infection

D. F. Johnson,<sup>1</sup> J. D. Druce,<sup>2</sup> C. Birch,<sup>2</sup> and M. L. Grayson<sup>1,3,4</sup>

***Clinical Infectious Diseases 2009; 49:275–7***

**The experiment compared the effectiveness of masks vs no mask in blocking influenza spread from the patient's mouth during coughing. ( Each patient coughed 5 times onto influenza sampling plate. )**

Patient or variable	Influenza type	Nasal swab	No mask, before control (step 1)	N95 mask (step 2)	Surgical mask (step 3)
Patient					
1	A	31	38	Negative	Negative
2	A	26	40	Negative	Negative
3	A	22	Negative	Negative	Negative
4	A	26	34	Negative	Negative
5	A	23	32	Negative	Negative
6	A	25	27	Negative	Negative
7	B	22	38	Negative	Negative
8	A	29	34	Negative	Negative
9	B	27	Negative	Negative	Negative

**Short Communication**


**Masks for Influenza Patients: Measurement of Airflow from the Mouth**

Sakae Inouye\*, Yasuaki Matsudaira<sup>1</sup> and Yoshibumi Sugihara<sup>2</sup>



**Measuring the speed of the wind from the mouth with an ultrasonic anemometer.**

## B. Coughing



**Compared with the airspeed without masks, all three masks reduced the speed to less than 1/10.**

## Take home message:

Simple surgical (synthetic fibers) masks filtered more than 90% of particles in coughing experiments and reduced the speed of particle emission( and ? the distance that infected particle could go.)



**แนะนำผู้ป่วยให้ใส่ mask อยู่เสมอ  
ระหว่างอยู่ในโรงพยาบาล  
หรือในสถานที่ที่มีคนอื่นอยู่ร่วมกัน**



**Screening**

**Mask for the patient**

**Mask for personnel**

# Example 1

## Journal Pre-proof

Risk of nosocomial transmission of coronavirus disease 2019: an experience in a general ward setting in Hong Kong

S.C.-Y. Wong, R.T.-S. Kwong, T.C. Wu, J.W.M. Chan, M.Y. Chu, S.Y. Lee, H.Y. Wong, D.C. Lung



PII: S0195-6701(20)30174-2

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2020.03.036>

**An 64 yo.unrecognized COVID-19 patient had stayed in an open cubicle (bed 2) ward A with 10 other patients for 35 hours before being transferred to airborne infection isolation room.AIR for intubation.**





**Ward A is a 53-bedded female medical ward for renal patients. (6 ACH, normal pressure setting)**



**A total of 71 staff and 49 patients were identified as contacts.**

# Close Contacts

**7 staffs = had contact within two metres of the index case for >15 minutes.**

**were subjected to a 14-day work exclusion and quarantine.**

**10 patients = shared the same cubicle with the index case.**

**were quarantined into an AIIR (or quarantine camp if patient was deemed clinically stable) for 14 days**

# Results:


All specimens from the 52 contacts were negative for SARS-CoV-2, including all patient close contacts and six of the seven staff close contacts.

**Why not infected ?????**

**All seven close contact staffs reported wearing a mask ( Five,N95s and two, surgical masks, respectively ) during patient contacts.**

# WEAR A FACE MASK

Cover mouth and nose, avoid touching mask once it's on.



The Son of a Man / by Rene Magritte



Ministry of Culture and  
Information Policy of Ukraine

#ArtOfQuarantine  
#FlattenTheCurve

**Mask for HCWs: ??? N95**

# Surgical Mask vs N95 Respirator for Preventing Influenza Among Health Care Workers

## A Randomized Trial

*JAMA. 2009;302(17):1865-1871*

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Mark Loeb, MD, MSc

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Nancy Dafoe, RN

---

James Mahony, PhD

---

Michael John, MD

---

Alicia Sarabia, MD

---

Verne Glavin, MD

---

Richard Webby, PhD

---

Marek Smieja, MD

---

David J. D. Earn, PhD

---

Sylvia Chong, BSc

---

Ashley Webb, BS

---

Stephen D. Walter, PhD

**Context** Data about the effectiveness of a surgical mask or respirator for protecting health care workers are limited. Although the likelihood that N95 respirators will be in short supply is uncertain, it is probable in many countries, knowing the effectiveness of a respirator is of great health importance.

**Objective** To compare the surgical mask and N95 respirator for protecting health care workers against influenza.

**Design, Setting, and Participants** Ninety-two health care workers, 446 nurses in emergency departments, medical and surgical wards in 10 Ontario hospitals.

**Intervention** Assignment to either a fit-tested surgical mask or N95 respirator while providing care to patients with febrile respiratory illness during the influenza season.

**Main Outcome Measures** The primary outcome was influenza infection, measured by polymerase chain reaction.

**Table 2.** Comparison of Laboratory-Confirmed Influenza Between the Surgical Mask and N95 Respirator Groups


	No. (%)		Absolute Risk Difference, % (95% CI)	<i>P</i> Value
	Surgical Mask (n = 212)	N95 Respirator (n = 210)		
Laboratory-confirmed influenza <sup>a</sup>	50 (23.6)	48 (22.9)	-0.73 (-8.8 to 7.3)	.86
RT-PCR influenza A	5 (2.4)	1 (0.5)	-1.88 (-4.13 to 0.36)	.22
RT-PCR influenza B	1 (0.5)	3 (1.4)	0.96 (-0.89 to 2.81)	.37
≥4-Fold rise in serum titers A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1) <sup>b</sup>	25 (11.8)	21 (10)	-1.79 (-7.73 to 4.15)	.55

**Table 3.** Comparison of RT-PCR Results for Other Respiratory Viruses Between the Surgical Mask and N95 Respirator Groups

	No. (%)		Absolute Risk Difference, % (95% CI)	<i>P</i> Value
	Surgical Mask (n = 212)	N95 Respirator (n = 210)		
Respiratory syncytial virus <sup>a</sup>	2 (0.9)	1 (0.5)	-0.47 (-2.07 to 1.13)	>.99
Metapneumovirus	4 (1.9)	3 (1.4)	-0.46 (-1.98 to 2.89)	>.99
Parainfluenza virus <sup>b</sup>	1 (0.5)	2 (1.0)	0.48 (-1.12 to 2.09)	.62
Rhinovirus-enterovirus	8 (3.8)	10 (4.8)	0.99 (-2.87 to 4.85)	.62
Coronavirus <sup>c</sup>	9 (4.3)	12 (5.7)	1.47 (-2.68 to 5.62)	.49
Total <sup>d</sup>	20 (9.4)	22 (10.5)	1.04 (-4.67 to 6.76)	.72

## Take home message:

In routine patient care, use of a surgical mask compared with an N95 respirator resulted in noninferior rates of laboratory-confirmed influenza.



Last Supper / b...



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Information Policy of Ukraine

*#ArtOfQuarantine*  
*#FlattenTheCurve*



**Screening**

**Mask for the patient**

**Mask for personnel**

**Faceshield**



---


# 2019-nCoV transmission through the ocular surface must not be ignored

We declare no competing interests.

*\*Cheng-wei Lu, Xiu-fen Liu, Zhi-fang Jia*

lcwchina800@sina.com

Department of Ophthalmology (CL, XL) and Division of Clinical Research (ZJ), Fudan University, China



**Screening**

**Mask for the patient**

**Mask for personnel**

**Faceshield**


**? Gown**

# Gown

## Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

CDC > Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) > Healthcare Professionals  
> Healthcare Supply of Personal Protective Equipment



 Coronavirus  
Disease 2019  
(COVID-19)

# Frequently Asked Questions about Personal Protective Equipment

**For healthcare activities with low, medium, or high risk of contamination, surgical gowns (ANSI/AAMI PB70 Levels 1-4) can be used. These gowns are intended to be worn by healthcare personnel during surgical procedures.**

# **Air, Surface Environmental, and Personal Protective Equipment Contamination by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) From a Symptomatic Patient**

Sean Wei Xiang Ong, MBBS

Yian Kim Tan, PhD

Po Ying Chia, MBBS

Tau Hong Lee, MBBS

Oon Tek Ng, MBBS, MPH

Michelle Su Yen Wong, PhD

Kalisvar Marimuthu, MBBS

Patient	Days of illness when samples were collected	Presence of symptoms during sampling	Symptoms	Disease severity <sup>a</sup>	Before/after routine cleaning
A	4, 10	Yes, both days	Cough, fever, shortness of breath	Moderate	After
B	8, 11	Yes on day 8; asymptomatic on day 11	Cough, fever, sputum production	Moderate	After
C	5	Yes	Cough	Mild	Before

**Table 2. Environmental and PPE Sites Sampled and Corresponding RT-PCR Results**

Sites <sup>a</sup>	Positive samples (patient C; before routine cleaning) <sup>b</sup>	Cycle threshold value <sup>c</sup>
Staff PPE sites		
Upper front part of gown	0/2	
Lower front part of gown	0/2	
Front surface of face visor mask	0/2	
Front surface of N95 mask	0/2	





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### On This Page

[The Study](#)

Area, sample	Intense positive/weak positive/negative†	Rate of positivity, %
<b>PPE in ICU with severe COVID patients</b>		
Face shield of medical staff	0/0/6	0
Sleeve cuff of medical staff	0/1/5	16.7
Glove of medical staff	0/1/3	25
<b>PPE in ward with milder COVID cases</b>		
Face shield of medical staff	0/0/3	0
Sleeve cuff of medical staff	0/0/3	0
Glove of medical staff	0/0/3	0

**Total positive = 2/25 (glove & sleeve cuff)** <sup>180</sup>

## Take home message:

Gowns worn by nurses caring for a COVID patients usually were not contaminated except at the sleeve cuff where inoculation of viruses might occur during donning or removal of the gloves.

## Take home message:

**We may not need a water impermeable gown except when massive bleeding or fecal soiling are anticipated. A cloth gown is enough.**



# Hospital personnels

**“First nCoV Care Teams”**

**ER & ICU**



**มีพัดลมอยู่หลังแพทย์ พัดออกทางหน้าต่าง**



**แพทย์ผู้ที่จะมาตรวจผู้ป่วยจะต้องสวม  
หมวก, mask, ถุงมือ, และเสื้อ gown**



หลังการตรวจผู้ป่วยเสร็จแล้วให้ **decontaminate** มือ



**decontaminate** พื้นโต๊ะ  
และเครื่องมือที่ใช้ตรวจ



**ถ้าจะต้องรับผู้ป่วยเข้ารักษาในโรงพยาบาล  
ให้จัดผู้ป่วยไว้ในห้องที่เตรียมไว้เฉพาะ**



**Use the new non-suction oxygen mask with highly efficient Virus Filters attached**

# Intubation: ?When?

**if an oxygen flow over 15Liter/min or a frequency of over 30 breaths/min is still not able to maintain oxygen saturation.**

# Intubation:

## Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

# Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings

Update April 13, 2020

**“ N95 respirators or respirators that offer a higher level of protection should be used instead of a facemask when performing or present for an aerosol generating procedure.”**

**Intubation: N 95 ???**

# SARS among protected healthcare workers (*MMWR* 2003;52:433)

54 year old Canadian doctor



Apr. 1-2, 2003: Examined 3 SARS patients



Apr. 4: Fever, cough, normal CXR



Apr. 8: LUL infiltrate



Apr. 12: Received oxygen & nebulized bronchodilator

# SARS among protected healthcare workers (*MMWR 2003;52:433*)

April 13,2003:

Admitted into ICU

Rx with BiPAP for 2 hrs,"he removed the mask repeatedly"  
intubated, "had copious sputum"

April 15-21,2003: 9 HCWs had SARS, all had worn the  
recommended protective equipments including gowns,gloves  
PCM2000 duckbill masks and goggles.

6 of these 11 HCWs had been present during the intubation  
period.



**PCM 2000 Duckbill Mask**  
**= N95 -equivalent mask**

## Take home message:

**For a very intimate contact with heavy load of infectious particles such as during endotracheal intubation, simple surgical mask and N95 mask are likely to be inadequate.**

**Why ???**

# *Efficacy of Face Masks in Preventing Inhalation of Airborne Contaminants*

DAVID J. PIPPIN, DDS, MS,\* RICHARD A. VERDERAME, DDS,† AND  
KURT K. WEBER, DDS‡




FIGURE 1. Inhalation chamber and recovery system. Capitis moulage is shown without mask.

% spore recovered

No mask (n=8)

24.6%

American Hospital masks (n=8)

-conventionally worn

24.2%

-taped masks

0.00%

3M masks (n=8)

-conventionally worn

30.9%

-taped masks

0.00%

Ref.: Pippin DJ et al. *J Oral Maxillofac Surg* 1987;45:319

# Take home message:

Ordinary- wearing masks perform poorly in protecting you against COVID 19 from a close range coughing due to leakage through the edges of the mask. However , you may get much more protection by taping the mask tightly to your face.


**What should we do, then???**



**Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs)**<sub>205</sub>



## Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPRs)




**Filter**





**Beware! :The filter on the expiratory end should be changed if its flow resistance has increased > 3cmH<sub>2</sub>O.**

**Caution!: Pay attention to filters which may have an influence on the function of some ventilators.**



**In the inspiratory limb of the circuit the Virus filter is placed on the entrance of Humidifier.**

**In the expiratory limb of the circuit the Virus filter is placed on the exit of the isolation system.**

**No PAPER in developing countries  
: What should we do ?**

## Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis

### Recommendations for Reducing Risk during Travel for Healthcare and Humanitarian Work

Barbara J. Seaworth<sup>1</sup>, Lisa Y. Armitage<sup>1</sup>, Naomi E. Aronson<sup>2</sup>, Daniel F. Hoft<sup>3</sup>, Michael E. Fleenor<sup>4</sup>, Adrian F. Gardner<sup>5</sup>, Drew A. Harris<sup>6</sup>, Rachel L. Stricof<sup>7</sup>, Edward A. Nardell<sup>8</sup>; for the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis

*Ann Am Thorac Soc Vol 11, No 3, pp 286–295, Mar 2014*

**“Approximately 10% of inhaled air does not pass through the filter in well-fitted disposable N95 models. Well-fitted reusable elastomeric respirators have approximately 2% face-seal leakage.”**

#### Table 4. Recommendations for respiratory protection

---

Respirators that are suitable for work with patients with TB are either disposable filtering facepiece respirators (N95 or higher) or reusable elastomeric respirators.



# Elastomeric Respirators

- The current Elastomeric Respirator TCID institutes:



North 7700 - S, M, L  
**134 Employees**



Moldex – S, M, L  
**2 Employees**



Powered Air Purifying  
Respirators  
**2 Employees**



TEXAS

Health and Human Services

Texas Department of State  
Health Services



**TEXAS**  
Health and Human  
Services

Texas Department of State  
Health Services

# **Use of Elastomeric Masks at a TB Hospital**

---

**Annie Kizilbash, MD, MPH  
Cynthia Guenther, RCP  
Richard Reed, RT, BSHED  
Debbie Mata, RN**

# Infection Control

---

- 40-50% of the staff converted to TST positive after employment
- A total of 7 nurses converted their TST in 1992
- 1-2% of the staff had TB disease



TEXAS

Health and Human Services

Texas Department of State  
Health Services

# Institution of RPP

---

- From surgical masks we migrated to elastomeric respirators
- TCID selected the elastomeric respirator over the N-95 respirator based on the following factors:
  - Reliability and Comfort
  - Better Respiratory Protection
  - Cost Effectiveness
  - Less Time Consuming for Fit Testing



TEXAS  
Health and Human Services

Texas Department of State  
Health Services

# Results

TCID has not had an employee TST conversion since 1994.



TEXAS

Health and Human Services

Texas Department of State  
Health Services

**What is the cost of an  
elastomeric mask ???**

**150-1000 Bahts !!!**



# แนะนำการใช้ Elastomeric Respirator (N95 or P100)

## สำหรับบุคลากรที่ทำงานใกล้ชิดผู้ป่วยโควิดเป็นเวลานาน



- ในยุคที่ **N95 อาจหาได้ยาก** → จึงมองหา **Elastomeric Respirator** แทน
- สามารถใช้ซ้ำ เป็นของคนคนนั้น
- ประสิทธิภาพการกรองดีไม่ต่ำกว่า 95% (N95) และไม่ต่ำกว่า 99.97% (P100)
- เปลี่ยนแค่ไส้กรองเมื่อครบกำหนด
- หน้ากากทำจากซิลิโคน เบา ยึดตัว กระชับกับหน้า แต่ต้อง **FIT test เสมอ**
- แนะนำ แพทย์ วิสัญญีแพทย์ แพทย์EP แพทย์ผ่าตัดผู้ป่วยโควิด แล็บที่เก็บสิ่งส่งตรวจ พยาบาลICU พยาบาลที่ต้องใกล้ชิดผู้ป่วยเป็นเวลานาน
- **หัตถการ:** bronchoscope, ใส่ ET tube, ดูดเสมหะ, พ่นยา หรือ ฝึกกรรม CPR

**ย้ำ!!** อันนี้เป็นหน้ากากของใครของคนนั้น ต้องฝึกใช้ ดูในVDOที่จัดให้ → **สำคัญ**ที่การใส่ การถอด และการเช็ดทำความสะอาดหลังใช้ทุกครั้ง พร้อมหาที่แขวนเก็บไว้ให้ผู้ป่วยของแต่ละคน

## Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

# Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings

Update April 13, 2020

## 4. Take Precautions When Performing Aerosol Generating Procedures (AGPs)

- Some procedures performed on patients with known or suspected COVID-19 could generate infectious aerosols. Procedures that pose such risk should be performed cautiously and avoided if possible.
- If performed, the following should occur:
  - HCP in the room should wear an N95 or higher-level respirator such as disposable filtering facepiece respirators, PAPRs, and elastomeric respirators, eye protection, gloves, and a gown.

**Any other choice for poor countries ???**

## Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)

# Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings


Update April 13, 2020

**“ N95 respirators or respirators that offer a higher level of protection should be used instead of a facemask when performing or present for an aerosol generating procedure.”**

# Detection of Infectious Influenza Virus in Cough Aerosols Generated in a Simulated Patient Examination Room

John D. Noti,<sup>1</sup> William G. Lindsley,<sup>1</sup> Françoise M. Blachere,<sup>1</sup> Gang Cao,<sup>4</sup> Michael L. Kashon,<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Thewlis,<sup>1</sup> Cynthia M. McMillen,<sup>1,2</sup> William P. King,<sup>3</sup> Jonathan V. Szalajda,<sup>3</sup> and Donald H. Beezhold<sup>1</sup>

***Clinical Infectious Diseases* 2012;54:1569–77**



**Unsealed mask = “attached using the tie straps or elastic headbands of the masks.”**

**An unsealed surgical mask blocked entry of 56.6% of infectious virus.**

**An unsealed N95 blocked 66.5% of infectious virus.**

**Tightly- sealed Mask = “sealed over the mouth of the breathing simulator using silicone sealant.”**

**Tightly sealed N95 blocked entry of 99.6% of infectious virus compared with 94.8% by a surgical mask.**

# Take home message:

Ordinary- wearing masks perform poorly in protecting you against COVID 19 from a close range coughing due to leakage through the edges of the mask. However , you may get much more protection by taping the mask tightly to your face.

# **Makarak Hospital**

**Apply an adhesive tape around the mask rim.**



**N95 masks: ? Reuse ?**

# REUSABILITY OF FACEMASKS DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC

FACING THE FLU



INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE  
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES

**“if an individual user needs to reuse his or her own disposable N95 respirator, it should be done in the following manner:**

**1. Place a medical mask or cleanable faceshield over the respirator so as to prevent surface contamination. ....**

# **Air, Surface Environmental, and Personal Protective Equipment Contamination by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) From a Symptomatic Patient**

Sean Wei Xiang Ong, MBBS

Yian Kim Tan, PhD

Po Ying Chia, MBBS

Tau Hong Lee, MBBS

Oon Tek Ng, MBBS, MPH

Michelle Su Yen Wong, PhD

Kalisvar Marimuthu, MBBS

**Table 2. Environmental and PPE Sites Sampled and Corresponding RT-PCR Results**

Sites <sup>a</sup>	Positive samples (patient C; before routine cleaning) <sup>b</sup>	Cycle threshold value <sup>c</sup>
Staff PPE sites		
Front surface of face visor mask	0/2	
Front surface of N95 mask	0/2	



# EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES®

ISSN: 1080-6059

[EID Journal](#) > [Volume 26](#) > [Early Release](#) > [Main Article](#)



*Disclaimer: Early release articles are not considered as final versions. Any changes will be reflected in the online version in the month the article is officially released.*

Volume 26, Number 7—July 2020

*Dispatch*

## Aerosol and Surface Distribution of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Hospital Wards, Wuhan, China, 2020

Zhen-Dong Guo<sup>1</sup>, Zhong-Yi Wang<sup>1</sup>, Shou-Feng Zhang<sup>1</sup>, Xiao Li, Lin Li, Chao Li, Yan Cui, Rui-Bin Fu, Yun-Zhu Dong, Xiang-Yang Chi, Meng-Yao Zhang, Kun Liu, Cheng Cao, Bin Liu, Ke Zhang, Yu-Wei Gao✉, Bing Lu✉, and Wei Chen✉

### On This Page

[The Study](#)

Area, sample	Intense positive/weak positive/negative†	Rate of positivity, %
<b>PPE in ICU with severe COVID patients</b>		
Face shield of medical staff	0/0/6	0
<b>PPE in ward with milder COVID cases</b>		
Face shield of medical staff	0/0/3	0

**N95 mask for health personnels:  
??? For how long can I use it???**

**“Even in Singapore, N95 masks were of limited supply therefore HCWs wore them throughout the hospital and re-used them for about a week. Thus far, this behaviour did not result in further SARS infection!”** *James L et al. Publ Health 2006;120:20-26*

## **Moving the patient:**

**Don't forget to put the mask on the patient. Patient 's mask alone can reduce more than 90% of viral dispersion from his/her mouth.**



**มีคนไปกดลิฟท์ไว้รอ  
ลิฟท์ที่ใช้เป็นลิฟท์สำหรับผู้ป่วย  
ซึ่งแยกจากลิฟท์ที่ใช้ทั่วไป**



**กดปุ่มให้ประตูเปิดค้างไว้  
แล้วออกจากบริเวณ**



มีการกำหนด เส้นทางขนย้ายผู้ป่วย  
ไว้ก่อนล่วงหน้า โดยกำหนดเส้นทางที่  
ปกติไม่ค่อยมีคนผ่าน



**ช่วงที่อยู่ในลิฟท์กับผู้ป่วยเป็นช่วงที่  
เสี่ยงต่อการติดเชื้อ เพราะเป็นที่แคบ  
และมีการถ่ายเททางอากาศน้อย**



**ผู้ที่ดูแล ขนย้ายผู้ป่วยถือว่าถูก contaminated  
ห้ามจับต้องสิ่งใด นอกเหนือจากเตียงผู้ป่วย**

กรุณาใช้เท้าปิดประตู

**ประตูนี้ออกแบบมาไม่ดี  
มือจับประตูเป็นแหล่งของการแพร่เชื้อ**

A photograph of a hospital hallway. In the foreground, a gurney with a patient is being pushed by two staff members wearing white protective gowns and green surgical caps. Another staff member in a white gown and blue mask stands by a glass door in the background. The floor is polished and reflective.

เจ้าหน้าที่ในหอผู้ป่วยจะเป็นคนเปิด  
และปิดประตูให้



**ระหว่างห้อง respiratory isolation room  
จัดวางผู้ป่วยไว้ใกล้หน้าต่าง เปิดหน้าต่างทั้งหมด  
เปิดพัดลมให้ลมพัดออกนอกอาคาร**



**หอผู้ป่วยจัดแยกเป็นสองส่วน**

**ไม่ให้มีการสัมผัสถึงกันทั้งคนและสิ่งของ**

- ส่วนการรักษาพยาบาลซึ่งถือว่าเป็นบริเวณที่มีการ **contaminated**
- ส่วนสนับสนุน เป็นส่วนทำงานด้านเอกสาร จัดเตรียมยา อุปกรณ์เครื่องมือ ที่จะใช้



**ผู้อยู่ในสวนการรักษาต้องไม่สัมผัสส่วนอื่น  
นอกเหนือจากผู้ป่วย เช่นรับโทรศัพท์ ขยับ  
mask หรือ face shield แต่ให้ผู้อื่นทำแทน  
และต้องไม่ผ่านเข้าไปในส่วนบริการ**



ผู้อยู่ในสวนการรักษาจะถูก **observed** โดยผู้ที่อยู่ในส่วนบริการ ว่ามีการ **contaminate** เกิดขึ้นในช่วงใดบ้างระหว่างการดูแลผู้ป่วยและจะบอกให้ทราบเพื่อทำการ **decontaminate** ทันที



# Effectiveness of measures to prevent SARS

**A case-control study in 5 Hong Kong hospitals**

**❖ 241 non-infected and 13 infected staffs**

**❖ about use of mask, gloves, gowns, and hand-washing**

# Effectiveness of measures to prevent SARS

## Results:

69 staffs who reported use of all four measures were not infected. Fewer staff who wore masks ( $p=0.0001$ ), gowns ( $p=0.006$ ), and washed their hands ( $p=0.047$ ) became infected compared with those who didn't, but stepwise logistic regression was significant only for masks( $p=0.011$ ).

# nCoV & Labs

# Which specimen ???

**a nasopharyngeal swab**

**sputum,**

**bronchoalveolar lavage,**

**or tracheal aspirate**

**if possible. lower respiratory tract specimens should be a priority for collection**

# Nasopharyngeal swab: Which mask ???

A nasopharyngeal swab is also considered an aerosol-generating procedure (AGP), because, for example, it can induce coughing.

*WHO. Infection prevention and control of epidemic-and pandemic prone acute respiratory infections in health care. WHO guidelines 2014 [17 January 2020].*

**Healthcare workers performing swabbing ,  
should wear (gloves, goggles, gown and  
FFP2/FFP3 respirator)**

*European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Infection prevention and control for COVID-19 in healthcare settings – March 2020. ECDC: Stockholm; 202*

**Note: According to European EN149 standard, FFP2  
≈ N95 ( in US. NIOSH standard)**

# Nasopharyngeal swab: Which mask ???

**My suggestion:**

***First Choice = PAPR***

***Second choice = Elastomeric mask***

***Third choice = Taped N95 mask***

***Forth choice = Taped surgical mask***

# COVID 19 vs. Toilet room

## **Aerodynamic Characteristics and RNA Concentration of SARS-CoV-2 Aerosol in Wuhan Hospitals during COVID-19 Outbreak**

Yuan Liu, Ph.D.,<sup>1,†</sup>, Zhi Ning, Ph.D.,<sup>2,†,\*</sup>, Yu Chen, Ph.D.,<sup>1,†,\*</sup>, Ming Guo, Ph.D.,<sup>1,†</sup>, Yingle Liu, Ph.D.,<sup>1</sup>, Nirmal Kumar Gali, Ph.D.,<sup>2</sup>, Li Sun, M.Sc.,<sup>2</sup>, Yusen Duan, M.Sc.,<sup>3</sup>, Jing Cai, Ph.D.,<sup>4</sup>, Dane Westerdahl<sup>2</sup>, D.Env.,<sup>2</sup>, Xinjin Liu, M.Sc.,<sup>1</sup>, Kin-fai Ho, Ph.D.,<sup>5,\*</sup>, Haidong Kan, Ph.D.,<sup>4,\*</sup>, Qingyan Fu, Ph.D.,<sup>3,\*</sup>, Ke Lan, MD, PhD,<sup>1,\*</sup>

**Table 1. Concentration of airborne SARS-CoV-2 at different locations in Wuhan**

Category	Sites	Sample Type	Concentration (copies m <sup>-3</sup> )
<b>Patient Areas (PAA)</b>			
Fangcang Hospital	1. Zone A Workstation <sup>#</sup>	TSP <sup>a</sup>	1
		TSP <sup>b</sup>	9
	2. Zone B Workstation	TSP	1
	3. Zone C Workstation <sup>#</sup>	TSP <sup>a</sup>	5
		TSP <sup>b</sup>	0
	4. Patient Mobile Toilet Room	TSP	19

jingcheng zhang      ORCID iD: 0000-0002-7555-8848


# Fecal specimen diagnosis 2019 Novel Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia

JingCheng Zhang, SaiBin Wang, YaDong Xue

Department of respiration, Jinhua Hospital of Zhejiang University(Jinhua  
Municipal Central Hospital), Jinhua, China 321000

***Journal of Medical Virology , March 03, 2020***

Figure 1. Viral nucleic acid test results in 14 patients with COVID-19.



## **COVID 19 vs. Toilet room**

**Stool RT- PCR's might become positive late in the course of COVID 19 infection. We don't know yet whether they were viable or not but it is prudent to close the toilet lid before flushing the toilet bowl.**

# COVID 19 vs.Tears


Received: 19 February 2020 | Accepted: 24 February 2020

DOI: 10.1002/jmv.25725

RESEARCH ARTICLE

JOURNAL OF  
MEDICAL VIROLOGY WILEY

## Evaluation of coronavirus in tears and conjunctival secretions of patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection

Jianhua Xia MM | Jianping Tong MD | Mengyun Liu MM | Ye Shen MD |  
Dongyu Guo MD 


**Only one patient with conjunctivitis yielded positive RT-PCR results. Fifty-eight samples from other patients were all negative.**

## **Opinion:**

**Ophthalmologists are likely to get COVID 19 from the patients' cough rather than from the patients' tear.**

**However, wash your hand before and after touching each patient.**

# COVID-19 vs. Blood



## Emerging Microbes & Infections




ISSN: (Print) 2222-1751 (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/temi20>

## Detectable 2019-nCoV viral RNA in blood is a strong indicator for the further clinical severity

Weilie Chen, Yun Lan, Xiaozhen Yuan, Xilong Deng, Yueping Li, Xiaoli Cai, Liya Li, Ruiying He, Yizhou Tan, Xizi Deng, Ming Gao, Guofang Tang, Lingzhai Zhao, Jinlin Wang, Qinghong Fan, Chunyan Wen, Yuwei Tong, Yangbo Tang, Fengyu Hu, Feng Li & Xiaoping Tang

A



# Opinion:

**COVID 19 viremia are well documented, exclusively among severe cases. However, nosocomial COVID 19 infection from needle stick or blood transfusion have not been reported yet.**

**However, beware of needle stick or sharp injuries. Never recap a needle.**

# Discontinue Isolation: When???

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**Accelerated Article Preview**

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# **Virological assessment of hospitalized patients with COVID-2019**

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Received: 1 March 2020

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

Accepted: 24 March 2020

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
Accelerated Article Preview

Published online 1 April 2020

Roman Wölfel, Victor M. Corman, Wolfgang Guggemos, Michael Seilmaier, Sabine Zange, Marcel A. Müller, Daniela Niemeyer, Terry C. Jones, Patrick Vollmar, Camilla Rothe, Michael Hoelscher, Tobias Bleicker, Sebastian Brünink, Julia Schneider, Rosina Ehmann, Katrin Zwirgmaier, Christian Drosten & Clemens Wendtner

**a****d**

**d**



**e**


pos. culture

neg. culture



# Terminal disinfection of COVID room

# Which Organisms?



# Survival of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus

Mary Y. Y. Lai, Peter K. C. Cheng, and Wilina W. L. Lim

Virology Division, Public Health Laboratory Services Branch, Centre for Health Protection, Department of Health, Hong Kong, China

***Clinical Infectious Diseases 2005; 41:e67–71***

**Table 2. Effect of disinfectants on severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus.**

Duration of exposure, min	Disinfectant (dilution), residual TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL					
	Hypochlorite (1:50)	Hypochlorite (1:100)	Detergent (1:50)	Detergent (1:100)	1% Virkon S <sup>a</sup>	VTM
5	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	10 <sup>5</sup>
10	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	10 <sup>5.5</sup>
20	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	10 <sup>5.5</sup>
30	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	<10 <sup>2</sup>	10 <sup>5.75</sup>


**NOTE.** VTM, viral transport medium.

<sup>a</sup> Manufactured by Antec International.

# Journal Pre-proof

Persistence of coronaviruses on inanimate surfaces and its inactivation with biocidal agents

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**nCoV can be efficiently inactivated by surface disinfection procedures with 62-71% ethanol, 0.5% hydrogen peroxide or 0.1% sodium hypochlorite within 1 minute.**

**0.05-0.2% benzalkonium chloride or 0.02% chlorhexidine digluconate are less effective/**

# **Air, Surface Environmental, and Personal Protective Equipment Contamination by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) From a Symptomatic Patient**

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Patient	Days of illness when samples were collected	Presence of symptoms during sampling	Symptoms	Disease severity <sup>a</sup>	Before/after routine cleaning
A	4, 10	Yes, both days	Cough, fever, shortness of breath	Moderate	After
B	8, 11	Yes on day 8; asymptomatic on day 11	Cough, fever, sputum production	Moderate	After
C	5	Yes	Cough	Mild	Before

**Twice-daily cleaning of high-touch areas was done using 5000 ppm of sodium dichloroisocyanurate.**

**All postcleaning samples were negative, suggesting that current decontamination measures are sufficient.**

## **Aerodynamic Characteristics and RNA Concentration of SARS-CoV-2 Aerosol in Wuhan Hospitals during COVID-19 Outbreak**

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Category	Sites	Sample Type	Concentration (copies m <sup>-3</sup> )
<b>Public Areas (PUA)</b>			
	20. Fangcang Hospital Pharmacy	TSP	3
	21. Renmin Hospital Doctor Office	TSP	0
	22. Renmin Hospital Outpatient Hall	TSP	0
	23. Renmin Hospital Outdoor	TSP	7
	24. University Office Doorside	TSP	0
	25. University Hospital Outpatient Hall	TSP	0
	26. Community Check Point	TSP	0
	27. Residential Building	TSP	0
	28. Supermarket	TSP	0
	29. Department Store 1	TSP	11
	30. Department Store 2	TSP	3
	31. Blank Control #	Field Blank <sup>a</sup>	0
		Field Blank <sup>b</sup>	0

**“In public areas outside the hospitals, we found the majority of the sites have undetectable or very low concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 aerosol, except for one crowd gathering site about 1 meter to the entrance of a department store with customers frequently passing through.”**



